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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an 
order of the district court entering judgment in favor of 
appellee Edward J. Foley, Sr., and against the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 98 Pension 
Fund (the "Pension Fund" or the "Fund"). 1 Foley claims that 
the Pension Fund's Board of Trustees ("Trustees") 
improperly declined to grant him an exception to the 
pension Plan's service eligibility provisions that would have 
permitted him to receive a higher level of benefits than that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There is some question as to which of the defendants the district court 
entered judgment against. While the court apparently intended to enter 
judgment only against the Fund, and the district court docket reflects 
this disposition, the individual defendants nevertheless have appealed. 
Inasmuch as we conclude that Foley was not entitled to a judgment 
against any of the defendants, the question is of no practical 
significance. However, as a matter of convenience, we will treat all the 
individual defendants except Fred Compton as appellants, as they in fact 
appealed. 
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to which he otherwise was entitled. Following a bench trial, 
the district court concluded that the Trustees arbitrarily 
and capriciously declined to apply the exception to Foley in 
the manner they had applied it to other employees seeking 
its benefit. Thus, it entered judgment in his favor on 
August 29, 2000. Appellants assert that the district court, 
when reviewing the Trustees' decision, erred in its 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard, as 
Foley was not similarly situated to other employees to 
whom the Trustees had applied the exception. Appellants 
also appeal the district court's subsequent award of 
attorneys' fees to Foley by order of December 8, 2000. For 
the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the district 
court's judgment on the merits and, accordingly, we also 




Foley is the former President of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 98 (hereinafter "the 
Union") and a former Trustee of the Union's Pension Fund. 
He worked in covered employment for Fund pension 
purposes, i.e., employment in the electrical industry, from 
1959 until his employer laid him off in 1971. Then, from 
1972 through 1980, Foley worked in his family's tire 
business, returning to employment in the electrical 
industry in 1981. Following his return to the electrical 
industry, Foley was elected the Union's President and he 
served as a Trustee of the Pension Fund from 1987 through 
July 1996. In July 1996, Foley retired and sought pension 
benefits. 
 
Under the Plan provisions, Foley forfeited all credited 
service earned prior to his return to work in 1981 because 
of a break-in-service provision which provided, in the years 
applicable to Foley, that accrued pension credits lapsed 
when a Plan participant did not work 600 hours in covered 
employment for a consecutive two-year period. There is, 
however, an exception to the break-in-service provision, 
known as the available-for-work exception, wherein the 
Plan provides that an employee shall not forfeit credited 
service if he was continuously available for work within the 
jurisdiction of the Union and unable to obtain covered 
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employment.2 Based on this exception, in 1988, shortly 
after Foley began his tenure as Trustee, the Trustees agreed 
to excuse his break-in-service pursuant to their 
understanding that work had not been available to him in 
covered employment from 1972 to 1980. 
 
On October 28, 1994, however, Fred Compton, a former 
Union president and Trustee, sent Laurance Baccini, 
counsel to the Pension Fund, a letter stating that the 1988 
decision was incorrect because the Trustees at that time 
based their decision on fabricated information improperly 
skewed in Foley's favor. Upon receipt of Compton's letter, 
the Trustees appointed a subcommittee to investigate 
Compton's allegations. Then, in February 1995, based on 
the subcommittee's recommendations, the Trustees 
reversed the 1988 decision because they concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence to substantiate Foley's claim 
that work was unavailable and that he was available for 
covered employment in the 1972-1974 period. 
 
In July 1996, Foley applied for pension benefits but, 
based upon their 1995 decision, the Trustees denied his 
application insofar as it sought credits for the period 
between 1959-1971. Foley appealed but was not successful 
as the Trustees determined that he still had not presented 
sufficient information to establish his entitlement to credit 
for the disputed years of credited service. 
 
On February 23, 1998, Foley commenced this action 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 
U.S.C. S 1001, et seq. ("ERISA"), in particular 29 U.S.C. 
SS 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3), which action, as subsequently 
amended, named the Fund, the Union, the Trustees, and 
various Union officers as defendants. In his complaint Foley 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The relevant Plan provision states: 
 
       Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in paragraph (a) and (b), 
       an employee shall not have forfeited any of his Credited Service 
       (past or future) or the right to any death benefit regardless of 
his 
       number of years of credited service if: 
 
       (1) he was continuously available for work within the jurisdiction 
of 
       the Union and was unable to obtain covered employment. 
 
Article I, Definitions, Section C "Break in Service" (c)(i). 
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asserted that the Trustees improperly applied a more 
demanding evidentiary standard to him than to other 
employees who had been granted an exception to the 
break-in-service provision notwithstanding a provision in 
the Plan that all "interpretations and decisions shall be 
applied in a uniform manner to all Employees similarly 
situated." In addition to his ERISA claims, Foley also 
asserted claims under the Labor Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. S 401 et seq., 
("LMRDA"), and the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 
SS 411 and 412. Following the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the district court dismissed all but 
Foley's ERISA claims. See Foley v. IBEW Local Union 98 
Pension Fund, 91 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Pa. 2000).3 We 
make no further reference to the dismissed claims, as Foley 
has not cross-appealed from their dismissal and has not 
asserted that we should affirm on the basis of these claims. 
 
After a bench trial in August 2000, the district court 
found that the Trustees arbitrarily and capriciously acted 
contrary to the terms of the Plan when they denied Foley 
credit for time during his employment in the electrical 
industry prior to his 1971 layoff. See Foley v. IBEW Local 
Union 98 Pension Fund, 112 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416-17 (E.D. 
Pa. 2000) ("Foley"). On August 29, 2000, the court entered 
judgment against appellants, and on December 8, 2000, 
entered an order granting Foley's motion for attorneys' fees. 
See Foley v. IBEW Local Union 98 Pension Fund, No. Civ. A. 
98-906, 2000 WL 1801273 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2000). 
Appellants have timely appealed from the judgment and 
order.4 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We reverse factual conclusions of the district court only 
if they are clearly erroneous, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), but 
exercise "plenary review over the trial court's choice and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Foley included Compton as a defendant but the parties later dismissed 
the action against him by stipulation. He is not a party on this appeal. 
 
4. The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(e) and 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
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interpretation of legal precepts and its application of those 
precepts to the historical facts." Orvosh v. Program of Group 
Ins. for Salaried Employees of Volkswagen of Am., 222 F.3d 
123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Where, as here, the plan administrator has 
discretion to interpret the Plan and the authority to 
determine eligibility, we review a denial of benefits under an 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. Id.  Under this 
standard: 
 
       a plan administrator's decision will be overturned only 
       if it is clearly not supported by the evidence in the 
       record or the administrator has failed to comply with 
       the procedures required by the plan. A court is not free 
       to substitute its own judgment for that of the 
       defendants in determining eligibility for plan benefits. 
 
Orvosh, 222 F.3d at 129 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).5 Further, "the district court cannot, by couching a 
legal conclusion as a finding of fact, prevent appellate 
review of legal errors." Louis W. Epstein Family P'ship v. 
Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation and 




The Trustees denied Foley credit for the disputed years of 
service because the subcommittee's investigation 
demonstrated that work had been plentiful between 1972 
and 1974, but that Foley was unavailable for work during 
that period due to his employment in the family tire 
business. The Trustees also found that Foley failed to 
produce any evidence supporting his claim. 
 
Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, 
the district court was bound to affirm this decision if it was 
not contrary to the Plan's terms and was rationally related 
to a legitimate Plan purpose. See Orvosh, 222 F.3d at 129- 
31. The district court determined that although the 
Trustees believed in good faith that they were treating Foley 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Foley unsuccessfully argued in the district court that the court should 
review the Trustees' decision on a de novo basis but he does not make 
that contention on this appeal. 
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the same as any other applicant seeking the benefit of the 
break-in-service exception, they actually treated him 
differently from other employees similarly situated in that 
they arbitrarily and capriciously subjected his application 
to a more demanding evidentiary standard and a stricter 
level of scrutiny than those of other employees. See Foley, 
112 F. Supp. 2d at 416. A district court, however, may not 
substitute its judgment for that of a plan's trustees in 
determining a claimant's eligibility for benefits, and, as we 
discuss below, the record demonstrates that the Trustees 
here did not arbitrarily and capriciously treat Foley as not 
being similarly situated to other employees to whom the 
exception to the break-in-service rule had been applied. 
 
The record shows that during a Trustees' meeting in 
1979, they determined that Foley forfeited the credits he 
earned from 1959-1971 as he had a two-year break in 
service as of 1973. In 1984, when, after resuming 
employment in the electrical industry, Foley inquired as to 
the status of those credits, Compton informed him that 
they had been forfeited and that it was "too late" to save 
them. 
 
In 1988, six months after Foley was elected President of 
the Union, he appointed himself, Paul Gilmore, and James 
Mackin to three of the six positions on the Fund's Board of 
Trustees. Shortly thereafter, the Board of Trustees granted 
Foley credits for the years 1959-1971, reversing its prior 
forfeiture of his credits even though he had not applied 
formally for their reinstatement. Indeed, Foley did not 
present documentary evidence to support the award of 
credits at the time he was awarded the credits. Instead, 
Mackin and Gilmore spoke on Foley's behalf, and the 
Trustees appear to have accepted their statements as true. 
The record shows, however, that Mackin and Gilmore did 
not have first hand knowledge of the germane facts as they 
had not been employed full time in the electrical industry 
during the 1972 to 1974 period.  
 
In October 1994, however, the Trustees received 
Compton's letter, "seriously question[ing]" the 1988 
decision and stating that "the [1988] pension trustees may 
have been either misled or misinformed" when they 
reinstated Foley's credits. Confronted with this formal 
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written challenge, the Trustees determined that they were 
obliged to review the facts and, accordingly, created the 
subcommittee to investigate the issues Compton raised in 
his letter. 
 
The subcommittee rendered its report in late 1994 or 
early 1995. It found that work opportunities were"plentiful" 
from 1971 through 1974 and, according to the record 
available to it, the hours electricians worked during that 
period evidenced "full employment, a few visiting brothers 
working and a decent amount of overtime." The 
subcommittee also determined that the Trustees in 1988 
primarily relied on Gilmore's statement that Foley was 
available for work but Gilmore admitted to the 
subcommittee that he knew only of Foley's availability after 
1975. The subcommittee interviewed Foley, who stated that 
he went into the family business in 1972 and periodically 
checked to see if electrical work was available. 
 
We recognize that the subcommittee noted that the lack 
of evidence supporting Foley's alleged availability for work 
in the electrical industry and inability to find work was not 
"unique" and that the "available for work-no work available" 
exception had been applied liberally. In fact, the 
subcommittee's report included a list showing each case in 
which the exception had been applied since 1980. 
Consequently, the subcommittee recommended that the 
Trustees construe the exception more strictly than they had 
in the past and that if they did so in Foley's case, they also 
should "examine" the included list, making"appropriate 
adjustments." Id. at 254 255.6  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. According to the list, in addition to Foley, 20 other employees applied 
for the benefit of the exception, only one unsuccessfully. Eight who were 
successful had signed the Union's "out-of-work" book signaling their 
availability for work. In three cases, the Trustees testified as to having 
first hand knowledge as to each employee's availability for work and in 
three other cases the employees had constant contact with the Union, 
and one submitted a letter detailing his work history. 
 
The district court found these distinctions from Foley's case "not 
meaningful or persuasive." Foley, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 414 n.2. It pointed 
out that during the period at issue, 1972-1974, a time that the Trustees 
found that work opportunities were plentiful, nine employees had been 
granted the "available for work-work not available" exception. Id. 
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In February 1995, following their review of the 
subcommittee's report, the Trustees unanimously voted to 
remove the credited service from Foley's pension record but 
advised him that at any time he could submit a request for 
reconsideration attaching relevant documentation. The 
Trustees also resolved to reinvestigate all other individuals 
to whom the "available for work-no work available" 
exception had been applied. See Foley, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 
413. 
 
In July 1996, when Foley applied for benefits, he did not 
submit additional information supporting a credit for 
service from 1959 to 1971. Accordingly, the Trustees 
awarded Foley pension benefits taking into account his 
break in service. Foley appealed the decision, but the 
Trustees concluded that they had "insufficient evidence as 
to the unavailability of work and Mr. Foley's inability to 
obtain covered employment during the Plan years 1972, 
1973 and 1974." 
 
The district court found that the Trustees acted in good 
faith and believed they did not treat Foley differently than 
other employees. Foley, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 415. However, 
the court determined that the Trustees actually held Foley 
to a stricter standard "than any other individual in like 
circumstances," id., arbitrarily and capriciously violating 
their duty to interpret the Plan and apply decisions"in a 
uniform manner to all Employees similarly situated." Id. at 
416 (citation omitted). 
 
The district court made much of the fact that the 
Trustees appointed the subcommittee to investigate the 
circumstances under which Foley had been granted the 
exception in 1988, yet failed to form a subcommittee to 
examine "any other plan participant's pension application." 
Foley, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 415. As the district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
However, of these nine, only two met the exception during 1973, and 
the remaining seven could not find work from 1974-1975. Most of those 
who could not find work in 1974-1975 were out-of-town workers who 
signed the out-of-work book. Of the two that met the exception in 1973, 
the Trustees had first hand knowledge of both employees' record. 
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recognized, however, the allegations of impropriety that 
Compton raised in his letter "justified a review of plaintiff's 
claim to determine whether there was any impropriety." Id. 
at 414 n.2. Thus, given the allegations of impropriety in the 
Compton letter, and in light of their fiduciary duties to the 
Fund, the Trustees reasonably and appropriately appointed 
the subcommittee in Foley's case. 
 
The district court next took issue with the actions the 
Trustees took upon receipt of the subcommittee's report. 
See id. The court seems to have been of the view that 
because the investigation yielded "no evidence of 
wrongdoing or deceit," the Trustees were bound to grant 
Foley's application for benefits as they had with"a number 
of individuals who sought refuge under the break-in-service 
exception . . . who, like Foley, produced a minuscule 
amount of evidence." Id. The court also seemed frustrated 
with the fact that the Trustees had not conducted an 
investigation with respect to the other employees who were 
granted the benefit of the exception. Id. at 415. These cases 
differed from Foley's, however, in that these employees' 
eligibility for the exception never was challenged. Further, 
the subcommittee did not uncover any evidence suggesting 
that any of them acquired pension credits through 
improper means.7 
 
In essence, the court held that because Foley was 
"similarly situated" to other employees who had benefitted 
from a liberal interpretation of the available-for-work 
exception, the Trustees' failure to award him the break-in 
service credits was "arbitrary and capricious." Foley, 112 F. 
Supp. 2d at 416. The premise of the court's decision was, 
however, erroneous as Foley was not similarly situated to 
rank and file Union members who had been granted the 
benefit of the exception. Rather, he was a Trustee when he 
sought to have service credits added to his pension record, 
and he appointed the Trustees who spoke on his behalf and 
apparently voted to grant him the benefit of the exception. 
Moreover, Foley's case was the only one under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Apparently, the Trustees referred the matter to the Fund professionals 
for follow-up. Several individuals who were granted the benefit of the 
exception now are deceased. See Appellants' Br. at 34. 
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available-for-work exception where issues of impropriety 
were raised, and his case was the only one in which the 
employee's entitlement to benefits under the exception was 
challenged. Furthermore, upon review of the 
subcommittee's report, the Trustees recognized that they 
did not have evidence to support the application of the 
exception to Foley. 
 
It is also significant that at a time that he should have 
been "continuously available for work" in order for his 
break in service to be excused, Foley was engaged in the 
family tire business and thus had an incentive not to work 
in the electrical industry. When the district court made its 
determination that the Trustees acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, it should have recognized that this 
circumstance distinguished Foley's case from those of other 
supposedly "similarly situated" employees who were granted 
the benefit of the exception, as Foley made no showing that 
they had incentives equivalent to his to eschew employment 
in the electrical industry. In the circumstances, it cannot 
reasonably be held that the Trustees arbitrarily and 
capriciously treated Foley differently from other employees 
similarly situated, and thus the district court erred in 
reaching its result. 
 
We emphasize that in focusing on the fact that credit 
under the available-for-work exception had been granted 
liberally in the past rather than examining whether the 
Trustees' decision was contrary to Plan language or 
whether it was rationally related to a legitimate Plan 
purpose, the district court did not properly credit 
significant evidence. This evidence included the 
subcommittee's finding that work was plentiful from 1972- 
1974, the Trustees' own recollections and understanding 
regarding the availability of work during that time, 
Gilmore's admission to the subcommittee of his lack of 
knowledge of the germane facts, Foley's failure to present 
evidence, and the circumstances in which Foley was 
originally granted the exception. The court, however, should 
have relied on this evidence as it was not free to substitute 
its judgment for that of the Plan administrators. See 
Orvosh, 222 F.3d at 129. 
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Moreover, the district court's holding binds the Trustees 
to a result that was a consequence of poor administrative 
practices, that the Trustees later corrected. In effect, the 
district court's decision improperly "straitjackets" the 
Trustees into granting benefits simply because of their past 
practices. See Oster v. Barco of Cal. Employees' Ret. Plan, 
869 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that prior 
record of granting requests is insufficient to establish that 
committee denied request in arbitrary and capricious 
manner and stating "[t]o hold otherwise would impair the 
flexibility necessary for proper financial management of 
such plans, a goal of Congress in holding ERISA fiduciaries 
to the `prudent man' standard") (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also Nazay v. Miller, 949 
F.2d 1323, 1336 (3d Cir. 1991) (plan administrator's 
decision not to waive requirement "was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious and did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion" where plan administrator waived requirement on 
14 previous occasions). We are particularly troubled by the 
fact that the district court effectively read the break-in- 
service forfeiture provision out of the Plan, as under the 
court's conclusions it is difficult to see how it ever could be 
applied in the face of an employee's claim that he is entitled 
to the benefit of the exception.8 
 
The district court's opinion also is problematical for 
another quite fundamental reason. While we know that the 
break-in-service exception was excused in 20 other cases in 
which employees claimed its benefit, the district court had 
no way of knowing the number of situations in which 
employees lost credits by reason of a break in employment 
during a consecutive two-year period but did not seek the 
benefit of the exception. Certainly if there were such 
employees, they were treated the same as rather than 
differently from Foley.9 But the district court did not 
consider this possibility. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Foley argues that the Trustees did not raise a"straightjackets" 
argument in the district court. We are satisfied, however, that they 
sufficiently made the contention to preserve it for this appeal. 
 
9. The subcommittee's report said that "[g]enerally, the available for 
work-no work available exception has been applied liberally in almost all 
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In summary, we conclude that in appointing a 
subcommittee to investigate the claims against Foley, the 
Trustees acted quite responsibly and consistently with their 
obligations as fiduciaries. Moreover, inasmuch as the 
Trustees' decision to deny the disputed benefits was not 
contrary to the Plan's terms and was rationally related to a 
legitimate Plan purpose, the district court erred in 
determining that the Trustees acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. Furthermore, because Foley was not 
similarly situated to the other employees who were granted 
the benefit of the exception, the Trustees were not bound to 
grant him the benefit of the exception merely because they 
had applied it in other cases. Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the district court.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
cases in which it has been invoked." The report, however, did not advise 
the Trustees of the number of cases in which the break-in-service 
forfeiture provision had been applied without the employee invoking the 
exception. Moreover, the parties' briefs do not suggest that there was any 
evidence on this point in the district court. In this regard, we point out 
that Foley had the burden of proof as he brought the action and had to 
demonstrate that the Trustees acted arbitrarily and capriciously. While 
we cannot be certain of the number of employees who did not receive the 
benefit of the break-in-service exception following an interruption of 
employment and forfeiture of credits, it may have been substantial. The 
list attached to the subcommittee's report reveals that over a period of 
about 15 years from 1980 until the subcommittee made its report, only 
21 employees sought the benefit of the exception. Yet, according to the 
district court, the Fund had more than $130,000,000"in its coffers" 
when Foley applied for fees. See Foley v. IBEW Local Union 98 Pension 
Fund, 2000 WL 1801273, at *4. A reasonable inference can be drawn 
from the size of the Fund that it must have provided for benefits for 
many employees and thus it well may be that many have lost pension 
credits by reason of breaks in service. Yet inasmuch as we only can 
speculate on this fundamental point, we do not understand how we can 
uphold the decision of the district court that the Trustees acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously. We add, however, that even without 
considering the possibility that some employees did not obtain the 
benefit of the break-in-service exception, our result would be the same 
as that we reach. 
 
10. The appellants contend that the district court erred in entering 
judgment against Scott Ernsberger, whom they describe as the Fund's 
"third party contract administrator," by reason of circumstances 
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particular to him, and that the court also erred in calculating damages. 
In view of our result, we do not reach these issues as we are reversing 
the judgment as to all appellants, including Ernsberger on common 
grounds and directing judgment to be entered in their favor, and 
because there will not be any damages to calculate. 
 
11. Certain of the defendants unsuccessfully sought attorneys' fees in 
the district court but inasmuch as they are not at this time seeking 
these fees we do not review the district court's order denying their 
application. 
IV. ATTORNEYS' FEES 
 
Finally, we come to the question of the attorneys' fees 
which ERISA permits when a participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary succeeds on any significant issue in the litigation 
which achieves some of the benefit sought from the suit. 
See 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g)(1). In light of our conclusions, it is 
clear that Foley has not prevailed on a significant issue in 
the litigation and thus, we will therefore reverse the district 
court's award of attorney fees. See Hensley v. Northwest 
Permanente P.C. Ret. Plan & Trust, 258 F.3d 986, 1002-03 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's judgment of August 29, 2000, and its order of 
December 8, 2000, and will remand the matter to the 
district court to enter judgment for the defendants. 
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